Contemporary societies are regulated by a complex system which tends to be sociallyexhaustive, supported by growing social and technical interdependence. This system iscomposed of subsystems: global economic production, liberal political institutions, anda social organization based on labour. As a whole, these three dimensions – political,economic, social – tend to compress contemporary life forms into a single way of life,primarily structured by systemic functionality. Although it admits variations of degree(or even, to some extent, qualitative differences), the functional codes (of systems)guide actions in dailiness and impose severe limitations on lifestyles, which areparticularly noticeable when the struggle for economic and social survival mobilises allthe time and energy of living. The means obliterate the end, the functioning obliteratesthe meaning, the survival obliterates proper human “life”. At the political level, liberalthought masks the“malaise of modern civilization”resulting from these limitations byshifting the question on forms of life to the private sphere, as well as insisting on anabstract political ethic of the“just”. Ultimately this determines the form and functioningof institutions, overriding any and all ethics of“good”.Particularly in the field of economics, a framework promotes a way of life that tends totransform individuals into subjects of consumption and production and to reduce alltheir relationships to the form of market exchange.Forms of life are privatised as far as political philosophical consideration is concerned,but they are also privatised economically in the sense that they tend to turn themselvesinto market supply given the hegemony of market form in the contemporary socialworld.Finally, the conditions that organise human existence also tend to naturalise acommodified conception of social time. On the one hand, contemporary temporalitytends to conform itself to a regime of in-built obsolescence and fragmentary experience;on the other, the conception of time underlying economical processes – such asevolution of interests, inheritance rights, etc. – tends to be an abstract time, that flowsregardless of what happens in the social world.The question that this colloquium proposes is, in essence: to what extent can the design of life forms be in the future freed from functional constraints (from the market, fromthe privatisation of the conceptions of the good, from the constraint of abstract time)and thus return to what ancient philosophers called eudaimonia, the“good life”or simplythe human good.
ABSTRACTS
Préférences, méta-préférences et formes de vie: qu’est-ce qu’un homo oeconomicus? Claire Pignol (Univ. Paris I) Les auteurs néo-classiques du XXe siècle qui fondent le choix sur la notion de préférence, oud’utilité ordinale, conçoivent une analyse économique neutre à l’égard des fins poursuivies parles agents. La notion d’utilité n’est qu’une manière de rendre compte des choix, lamaximisation du profit qu’un instrument permettant le meilleur usage des ressources et destechniques pour satisfaire les préférences. La rareté originelle ne portant pas seulement sur lesrichesses matérielles ou monétaires mais sur tout ce qui peut être estimé ou désiré, les choixne visent pas l’accroissement quantitatif des richesses mais l’ajustement de leur forme auxdésirs de chacun. L’économiste revendique d’être muet sur les fins et les formes de viechoisies par chacun. Le revers de cette neutralité est-il d’être sourd aux insatisfactionsd’agents à qui l’économie marchande imposerait une forme de vie tout entière orientée versl’accroissement des moyens dans l’oubli des fins ? La notion de méta-préférence, proposée parFrankfurt, Sen et Hirschman, suffit-elle à rendre compte de ce paradoxe ?
Communauté, individu, système José Manuel Santos (Praxis-UBI)
L’être humain serait, d’après Aristote, un animal “naturellement communautaire”. Une communauté est un groupe dont les membres agissent, en coopérant, en vue d’une fin bénéfique pour tous. La forme de communauté la plus propre de l’homme serait la « communauté politique », la cité, une communauté dont les membres, les citoyens, délibèrent et décident les formes et les règles de leur vie ensemble, et dont la fin serait une « vie bonne ». Cela laisse supposer l’unicité de la « forme de vie ».La philosophie politique moderne met en cause la communauté en tant que forme naturelle de la société. L’ordre social est pensée dans la perspective de l’individu libre et autonome, de ses droits naturels et du « contrat » qui lui garantisse la jouissance de ces droits à l’intérieur de son espace de liberté. Chacun aura la liberté et le droit de choisir sa forme de vie. Dans la société des individus il y aura, donc, un pluralisme des formes de vie. Dans cette société l’organisation de la vie ne procède plus des normes et institutions de la communauté, mais de dispositifs tels que les « systèmes sociaux » ou « systèmes fonctionnels » décrits par Luhmann. La société des systèmes est la forme sociale la plus adéquate à une société d’individus libres et autonomes.
Même si la société des systèmes semble favoriser la pluralité des formes de vie, la question se pose de savoir si les systèmes ne conditionnent pas le choix et le dessin de ces formes – ce qui ferait de la liberté de l’individu une illusion. En outre, la question de la forme de vie individuelle, question « privée », n’est pas totalement séparable de celle de la forme de la vie avec les autres, de la vie sociale et politique. Les formes de cette vie collective semblent encore plus déterminées par certains systèmes sociaux que celles de la vie individuelle. Dans ce cas, on aurait des raisons pour questionner les systèmes, et pour envisager une forme de communauté qui permettrait à ses membres de délibérer sur les formes de leur vivre ensemble, sur une éthique politique.
A aventura como forma de vida. Abordagem fenomenológica Irene Borges Duarte (Praxis-UE)
L’aventure comme forme de vie. Une perspective phénoménologique.Ce travail cherche à faire une phénoménologie du comportement qu’on nomme«aventure» et de la temporalité que lui est propre. On essaye par là de trouverce qu’est charactéristique de l’expérience originaire et de sa sédimentationdans une atitude et forme vitale, potentiellement banalisable. Dans ce sens, onpartira de l’essai de Simmel (1910) sur l’aventure, avant d’aborder l’analyse deJankélévitch (1963), qui comprenne ce phénomène dans sa relation avec ‘ennuiet le sérieux. Finalement, la perspective ateinte est dirigée vers la considerationexistentiale heideggérienne, pour essayer de comprendre l’ouverture de mondequ’elle nous presente, et dans son sens le plus propre, et dans des acceptionsdécadentes de type répétitif, en poursuivant la réalisation d’expéctationssédimentées. L’horizon humain de cette recherche est à la fois celui de l’individu, dans les temps de son existence singulière, et celui de la culture, donton peut reconnaître des époches spécialement ouvertes à la considération decertaines façons de l’aventure comme formes de vie éminentes.
A historical blockage that we all experience has been accompanied in the intensifications oflived temporalities, with a key role for speed, as it has been argued since Virilio to Avanessianand Srnicek. Together these two, blockage an acceleration, provide an extended eschatologicalmoment of a time constantly near or past its own end (the latest emanation being the climatenarrative). However, this logic is already built into the basic structure of capitalism as analyzedby Marx: a regime of overwork and marginal consumption. The talk will question the rhythmsone can use to cope with this eschatological pressure.Wittgenstein, Justice, and Liberalism Robert Vinten (IFILNOVA, Univ. Nova de Lisboa) The question of whether Wittgenstein was a liberal philosopher has received less attentionthan the question of whether he was a conservative philosopher but, as Robert Greenleaf Bricehas recently argued, there are hints of liberalism in some of his remarks, and somephilosophers, like Richard Eldridge, have argued that a kind of liberalism follows fromWittgenstein’s later philosophy. Richard Rorty has also drawn liberal conclusions from aphilosophical viewpoint which draws on Wittgenstein’s work and Alice Crary has suggestedthat the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are “reflected in forms ofsocial life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy”. Here I will argue both thatWittgenstein was not a liberal and that his philosophy does not imply a liberal viewpoint. Inaddition, I will argue that the (left-liberal) conceptions of justice proposed by Chantal Mouffeand José Medina do not find support in Wittgenstein’s work in the ways that they suppose.The authors discussed here do not demonstrate that any broad ideological conclusions followfrom Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks.
Any hope for plurality? On the ideological function of capitalism and the possibility of transformation Gonçalo Marcelo (CECH, Univ. de Coimbra / Católica Porto Business School)
This presentation will take as its starting point the ideological function of capitalism,understood, following Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), as the set of values and beliefs aimed atjustifying (or perhaps even naturalizing) the mode of economic coordination promoted bycapitalism, and thus making sure social actors collaborate peacefully under this mode ofcoordination and refrain from envisaging meaningful alternatives to it. Against this backdrop,the overarching question of the presentation will be the following: do the systemic injunctionsput forward by capitalism and internalized through its “spirit” or “ideology” leave anymeaningful space for so-called “alternative” modes of life, fostering what could be called asocial plurality of ways of life? Or is it that we cannot escape the apparent paradox /ideological trap through which ideals of creativity and autonomy are constantly put forward while, at the same time, they only translate in an erosion of worker’s rights (e.g. theconnection between “flexibility” and the emergence of the “Precariat”) and an ever greateremphasis on the cycle of production and consumption in which the single, most importantfreedom seems to be market freedom?In order to tackle this problem, in which social, political and economic factors are deeplyintertwined, I will question anew, following some indications by Boltanski and Fraser (2014)the role of critique in the quest for “emancipation”. Starting from Fraser’s tripartite theory ofjustice (in which economic redistribution, cultural recognition and political representation aretreated as distinct albeit intersecting dimensions of justice) I will argue that any meaningfultransformation will have to operate on all three levels. Namely, for the case discussed here,the very possibility of thick conceptions of the good giving way to “alternative” ways of life andthus fostering “social plurality” hinges, in my view, both on: 1) the economic, as “realfreedom” understood as “social freedom” requires stronger redistributive or predistributiveschemes, rather than an economic system structurally fostering inequality – or perhaps, even,a “postproductivist” standpoint; and 2) the political, at the level of the political inclusion ofdenizens and also of the political will of polities to move in the direction of social andeconomic reform.References:- Boltanski, Luc & Fraser, Nancy. Domination et emancipation. Pour un renouveau de lacritique sociale. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2014.- Boltanski, Luc & Chiapello, Ève. Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme. Paris: Gallimard, 1999.- Fraser, Nancy. Scales of Justice. Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World. New York:Columbia University Press, 2010.
“Formas de vida” e “subsunção real”. A sociedade contemporânea na leitura do operaismoitaliano Irene Viparelli (CICP, Univ. Évora)
A presente intervenção visa analisar o conceito de “formas de vida”, assim como encontra-se declinado pelo operaismo italiano. A primeira parte, procurando definir as origens daproblemática das “formas de vida”, focar-se-á nas polémicas das décadas de 1960 e 1970 emtorno da dialéctica. Tentar-se-á mostrar que a complexificação das sociedades doneocapitalismo, ao colocar em crise a representação marxista ortodoxa da relação entreestrutura e superestrutura, abre o caminho para duas estratégias de redefinição da questão dasubjectividade: ou a sua deslocação para o plano do aleatório ou a sua ontologização.Na segunda parte a análise focar-se-á na relação entre a multiplicidade das “formas de vida” ea tendência funcionalístico-sistémicas à unilateralização do ser. A perspectiva ontológica dooperaismo, ao reconhecer nas “formas de vida” a base da valorização do capitalcontemporâneo, por um lado afirma o primado ontológico da multiplicidade subjectiva, poroutro salienta a dependência do próprio capital relativamente às diferenças: têm que serdisciplinadas, hierarquizadas, mas nunca podem ser destruídas. O referido primado ontológico das “formas de vida”, no dispositivo operaista, representa quer a chave para compreender acrise de 2008 quer, ao mesmo tempo, o elemento que nos obriga a permanecer numaperspectiva teórica emancipatória.
A eudaimonia do livro em questão: arqueologia das formas de leitura contemporâneas Daniel Melo (CHAM, Univ. Nova de Lisboa)
Esta comunicação propõe uma reflexão sobre o lugar do livro e da leitura na nossacontemporaneidade, entendida num sentido amplo. Ou seja, busca analisar criticamenteaquele tempo em que ainda nos inscrevemos, grosso modo, o tempo pós-Antigo Regime, docidadão e das massas, mas sem esquecer a importância de certas heranças culturais de maislonga-duração.Por isso, não se detém somente na actualidade, mas pretende contribuir para a suacompreensão através do alargamento do enfoque. Também aborda fenómenos indissociáveis,como o digital e a Internet, pois quatro décadas de disseminação e apropriação colectivasconferem-lhes uma sedimentação temporal que os torna abordáveis pela História do tempopresente.Para ir ao encontro do tema do colóquio esta foi a proposta que pareceu mais profícua a uminvestigador ora centrado na história contemporânea da leitura, do livro e da edição. Emboraainda confinado a um work in progress, considerou-se que assim se iluminariam nexos entrepolítica, sociedade e cultura, potenciando inter-relações que não seriam descortináveis numaanálise estritamente subdisciplinar. Também se pretendeu analisar articulações com atecnologia, mas não se tratou de avaliar a tecnologia per se, mas sim certas intençõessubjacentes e do seu uso em tendências colectivas já relativamente estabelecidas e analisadas.Neste quadro, o presente texto não pretendeu ser sistemático nem panorâmico mas simfornecer pistas de leitura para algumas questões que se julgaram mais prementes hoje, apartir da revisão da literatura académica disponível, integrando testemunhos e estudos decariz qualitativo, quantitativo e misto, de variadas proveniências disciplinares e intelectuais.A comunicação foi dividida em 4 partes interligadas entre si: 1) topografias do livro e da edição– da escassez à abundância de livros que esconde tudo o resto; 2) arqueologia das formas deler – da «leitura longa» à «leitura descontínua, segmentada e fragmentada»; 3) arqueologiadas formas de comunicar – controlo, manipulação e imersão, erosão da reflexividade, daintrospecção e do pensamento crítico; 4) outras causas inibidoras do autoconhecimento e doempoderamento: sobre memória, raciocínio e entorses pedagógico-ideológicas.
Formas de vida na mutação do tempo social: implicações éticas e antropológicas Ana Leonor Santos (Praxis-UBI) / André Barata (Praxis-UBI)
Uma época que se apercebe viver e conviver num regime temporal acelerado e que reflectesobre as implicações dessa mutação não pode deixar de fazer acompanhar a sua reflexão poruma atenção a implicações éticas e antropológicas que dela decorrem. Com esta preocupaçãoteórico-prática no seu horizonte, esta comunicação organiza-se em três partes. Numaprimeira, será feita uma breve revisão da literatura que identifica três mutações na experiênciasocial do tempo na modernidade mais tardia – um tempo abstracto, sem fissuras efragmentado. Numa segunda e terceira etapas, deter-nos-emos nas implicações éticas eantropológicas destas mutações. Assim, por um lado, do ponto de vista ético partiremos dapremissa de que o tempo fragmentado e acelerado não é o tempo da ética, procurandoilustrar este desajustamento através de vários topoi de relevância ética. E, por outro lado, doponto de vista antropológico procuraremos interpretar estas mutações na experiência socialdo tempo a partir de um quadro mais amplo e unificador de desligamento do mundo.
